Economic security

Economic security: What do critical functions depend on, and what happens if that dependency is disrupted?

An organisation can be profitable today and vulnerable tomorrow. All it takes is one indispensable supplier, one key customer, one logistics route, an unavailable raw material, a sudden regulatory change or a disruption to funding for it to become apparent that the reported efficiency depended on conditions that no longer exist.

Economic security begins with the question not only of ‘how well the system is working now’, but ‘which of its functions must continue, what could disrupt or interrupt them, how quickly would the damage occur, what alternatives exist, and what is the economically justifiable cost of preparedness’.

SOLISFERADOME ANALYTICS carries out economic security analyses for companies, public institutions, institutional and professional investors, and other organisations. The service links economic, financial, operational, market and statistical data to identify critical interdependencies, possible channels for the transmission of shocks, the capacity for adaptation, and measures to mitigate disruptions, downtime and economic losses.

The aim is not to create a sense of absolute protection. Zero risk does not exist, and eliminating every interdependence would be economically impossible and often unreasonable. The aim is to strike a proportionate balance between efficiency, reserves, diversification, flexibility, cost and an acceptable residual risk.

What is economic security?

The concept has different meanings depending on the level of analysis. It may refer to household income and employment, the resilience of a business, the continuity of a public service, the security of sectoral supplies, or the strategic autonomy of a country or economic union. These meanings are related but not interchangeable.

For the purposes of this service, economic security is the ability of a given organisation, project, activity or public system to maintain or restore predefined critical economic functions in the event of disruptions to supplies, resources, funding, demand or the regulatory environment. This means that functions must be maintained at least at a minimum acceptable level, irreversible losses must be limited, and recovery must be achieved within an acceptable timeframe and at an acceptable cost.

This is an operational, rather than an absolute, definition. It requires the identification of the facility, the functions, the timeframe, the minimum acceptable capacity, the acceptable duration of the disruption or interruption, the resources, the alternatives and the criterion for acceptable risk. The statement ‘the organisation is secure’ has no verifiable meaning unless these conditions are defined.

At European Union level, economic security also encompasses broader geo-economic risks relating to the resilience of supply chains, critical infrastructure, technological security and the use of economic dependencies as a means of coercion. This service can analyse economic exposure to such processes, but does not constitute an official national security assessment.

What do risk, dependence, vulnerability and resilience mean?

A shock is understood to mean a sudden event or change that places pressure on the system: a shortage, a price spike, the loss of a supplier, the loss of a market, a regulatory ban or another significant factor.

Disruption is a partial impairment of normal functioning. Operations continue, but at a reduced scale, over a longer period, to a lower standard or at a higher cost. Interruption is a temporary or prolonged complete cessation of a critical function or the unavailability of a necessary resource. This distinction is important because partial impairment and complete cessation give rise to different losses, response times and measures.

Exposure indicates which revenues, processes, assets, services, contracts or public functions may be affected and to what extent.

Dependency refers to the need for a specific resource, counterparty, market, infrastructure, technology, authorisation, skill or source of funding. Dependency is not automatically a weakness. It becomes a significant vulnerability when the object is critical, concentration is high, a substitute is unavailable or too slow, and the consequence of the disruption or interruption is significant.

Vulnerability is a property of the system under analysis that allows a given shock to cause disproportionate harm. The same external shock may have different outcomes for two organisations due to differences in stocks, contracts, spare capacity, liquidity, technological substitutability and managerial preparedness.

Criticality combines the importance of a function with the time within which its deterioration or cessation becomes unacceptable. A component of small value may be critical if, without it, an entire production or administrative process comes to a halt.

Resilience is the system’s ability to withstand an impact, adapt and restore the necessary function. It does not mean a return to the previous state at any cost; sometimes the economically more sensible response is a change in technology, supplier, product, route or organisational model.

Residual risk is the risk that remains after the measures have been implemented. It must be recognised, monitored and accepted by the relevant management level, rather than concealed by a formally low assessment.

What does the service include?

Map of critical functions and value streams

We identify which products, services, processes and public functions are critical to revenue, employment, contractual obligations, public service delivery or long-term viability. We trace how materials, energy, information, technology, labour, payments and decisions flow through them.

The map is not an organisational chart. It shows what the outcome actually depends on and how a disruption or interruption would spread to other processes, counterparties or community groups.

Analysis of suppliers, raw materials and supply chains

We assess the concentration of suppliers and countries of origin, critical materials and components, contractual and logistical lead times, stock levels, potential substitutes, second- and subsequent-level dependencies, and the time required to qualify an alternative.

A second supplier does not constitute genuine diversification if it uses the same factory, raw material, port, technology or owner as the first. We therefore consider not only the number of counterparties, but also the common points of failure and the actual independence of the alternatives.

Analysis of customers, markets and revenue

We examine dependence on key customers, channels, platforms, contracts, geographical markets and public sector clients. We combine the relative share of revenue with the margin, payment terms, replacement costs and the likely time required to recover volume.

High concentration may be economically rational where relationships are stable and the costs of diversification are excessive. However, it must be recognised as a risk rather than taken for granted as a source of future revenue.

Energy, resource and logistical dependence

We analyse the consumption and substitutability of energy, water, raw materials, transport, warehouses, ports, roads and other economically essential services. We determine how price increases, shortages, disruptions or interruptions affect capacity, cost price, lead times and the fulfilment of contracts.

The technical safety of facilities and physical security are not covered by this service. Where the analysis identifies a technical dependency, its engineering reliability should be assessed by a competent specialist, and the economic analysis uses this result as input.

Financial capacity to withstand disruption or interruption

We assess how the shock affects revenue, margins, cash flows, working capital, contractual payments, credit lines and the necessary recovery reserve. This component indicates how long the organisation can sustain the critical function and at what point the operational problem becomes a financial one.

Where a detailed analysis of cost of goods sold, liquidity, budgets and accounting variances is required, this is carried out as part of the ‘Financial Analysis and Stress Testing’ service. This service does not include analysis of financial instruments, portfolios, derivatives or investment recommendations.

Technological, contractual and personnel dependencies

We map economic dependencies on licences, platforms, cloud services, specialised hardware, patents, key contracts, permits, data, professional expertise or a limited pool of specialists. We assess the time and cost of replacement, the loss of productivity and the feasibility of knowledge transfer.

This is not a cybersecurity test, a legal analysis of intellectual property or a personnel assessment. The aim is to measure the economic impact of unavailability and the existence of a viable alternative.

Regulatory and geo-economic exposure

We examine how changes to trade regimes, licensing regimes, standards, subsidies, public procurement, sanctions, export restrictions, local requirements or international relations may affect supply chains, market access, costs and investment.

The analysis identifies exposure and economic scenarios. It does not constitute a legal opinion on the applicability of any sanctions, customs, competition, tax or other regimes. Legal compliance must be confirmed separately by a competent lawyer or authority.

Scenarios, measures and early warning system

We develop plausible scenarios and trace the chain of events from the initial shock to the operational and financial outcome. We compare measures such as diversification, a backup supplier, strategic stockpiling, an alternative route, contractual protection, additional capacity, insurance, knowledge transfer or a change in product structure.

We define key performance indicators, thresholds, responsible parties and management actions. Early warning is only valuable if the signal leads to a pre-defined decision; a dashboard without rules for action produces information, but not certainty.

What does the service expressly not include?

The service does not constitute an activity relating to national security, intelligence, counter-intelligence, investigation, security, physical security, military or defence planning. Classified information, state secrets, operational intelligence data or information requiring special authorisation to access are not required and must not be provided.

It does not include penetration testing, technical cybersecurity audits, information vulnerability assessments, safety engineering, fire protection, health and safety at work, or management system certification.

The service is not an independent financial audit, an accountancy service, a credit rating, an actuarial valuation, a banking supervisory stress test, a business or asset valuation, quantitative finance, investment management or a personalised recommendation for a financial transaction.

It does not constitute legal due diligence and does not certify compliance with sanctions, export controls, public procurement, competition law, data protection or specific sectoral regulations. Economic analysis may highlight where a legal issue is critical, but the legal conclusion rests with a competent specialist.

The analysis does not guarantee that disruption or interruption will not occur, that every threat will be anticipated, or that loss will be avoided. It improves the basis for decision-making through available evidence and clearly defined assumptions.

Who is this service intended for?

Companies and industries

The service is suitable for manufacturing, commercial, logistics, energy, agricultural, tourism, construction, technology and professional organisations that rely on critical resources, counterparties, markets or infrastructure. The size of the organisation is not a determining factor; a small firm with a single key client may be more vulnerable than a large group with numerous alternatives.

Public institutions and organisations

The analysis supports the planning of public service continuity, budgetary and resource sustainability, security of supply, contractor capacity, the economic dependencies of a sector, municipality or programme, and the distribution of impacts amongst citizens, businesses and regions.

When working with a public contracting authority, we use only information that can be lawfully provided and processed. The result does not replace an official assessment, which the law requires a competent authority to carry out.

Institutional and professional investors and organisations

The service can assist in assessing operational dependencies, concentration, resilience and sustainability of a business, project, infrastructure or sector. It provides analytical input for decision-making but does not itself determine investment value, creditworthiness or a recommendation to buy, sell or finance.

When might the service be required?

The analysis is particularly useful prior to a significant investment, entry into a new market, an acquisition, a relocation, a change of supplier, automation, the centralisation of operations or a long-term contract. Such decisions can improve efficiency whilst simultaneously creating a new concentration of risk or irreversibility.

The need also arises when a single customer, supplier, country, platform, energy source, specialist or source of funding is of disproportionate importance; when there is no proven alternative; when stock levels are low relative to the replacement timeframe; or when the organisation does not know how long it can maintain the critical function.

Following an actual disruption or outage, the analysis can identify the source of the loss, which safeguards were effective, where assumptions were incorrect, and what needs to be changed. This is not about apportioning blame, but about reviewing the system and the decisions made.

For a public institution, the analysis is useful where a public service, public procurement contract, infrastructure project, sectoral policy or regional economy is heavily dependent on a limited pool of resources and contractors.

If the potential loss is small, the disruption or interruption has a limited and easily reversible effect, and affordable alternatives are available, a detailed analysis may cost more than the risk it is intended to manage. The depth of the analysis must be proportionate to the criticality, irreversibility and cost of a wrong decision.

What decisions can the analysis support?

The result can assist in choosing between a single efficient supplier and a diversified supply base; between minimum and strategic stock levels; between in-house and external capacity; between centralised and distributed infrastructure; between short-term savings and more costly sustainability; as well as the selection of markets, routes, technologies, contractual mechanisms and monitoring indicators.

In the context of public decision-making, the analysis can assist in prioritising critical services, reserves, infrastructure investments, public procurement, and industrial and regional measures. It highlights the economic benefits, costs and distributional effects, but does not turn political or moral choices into technical inevitabilities.

What data is required?

The required data set depends on the decision and the system’s boundaries. Typically, the following are used: descriptions of critical products, services and processes; revenue and margins by customer, product, channel and market; lists of suppliers and purchases; materials, components and specifications; countries and places of origin; contractual terms; stock levels; logistics routes; production capacity; alternative options and lead times.

To assess resilience, data is required on fixed and variable costs, cash flows, working capital, financing limits, insurance cover and recovery costs. These are used only to the extent necessary for the economic scenario.

For technological and personnel dependencies, the following are used: licence and service agreements, critical equipment, life cycle, time required to implement a replacement, key skills, training time and process documentation. Passwords, cryptographic keys, technical penetration data or special categories of personal data are not required.

For the external environment, official statistics, foreign trade data, price and production indices, company reports, regulatory acts, sector-specific sources, data on transport, energy and raw materials, and verifiable information on events and policies.

Before exchanging sensitive information, the minimum necessary scope, purpose, format, legal basis, secure channel, authorised access and retention period must be determined. Where detail is not required, data is aggregated, pseudonymised or replaced with ranges.

Is it possible to work solely with public data?

Yes, but to a limited extent. Public sources can reveal sectoral concentration, international trade, macroeconomic and price exposure, publicly known suppliers, infrastructure, regulations and reported company results.

They do not usually reveal actual stock levels, contractual terms, internal routes, margins, spare capacity, informal dependencies, lead times, or relationships beyond the first tier of suppliers. Therefore, public analysis can identify external risks and likely vulnerabilities, but should not be presented as a complete assessment of internal resilience.

How do we work?

1. We define the decision and the critical function

We begin with a specific management question. We identify which products, services, public functions or contractual obligations must be maintained, at what minimum level and for what period.

2. We define the scope and criteria

We define the organisation, units, chain, geographical scope, reference date, time horizon, permissible duration of the disruption or interruption, minimum capacity and the criterion for an unacceptable loss. Without common boundaries, comparisons and assessments are not valid.

3. We map the flows and interdependencies

We track materials, energy, logistics, technologies, people, contracts, revenue and funding. We look for single points of failure, the common origin of seemingly different alternatives, and interdependencies between processes.

4. We verify the data and assumptions

We establish the origin, time period, unit of measurement, completeness and comparability. We distinguish established facts from staff assessments, external claims and analytical assumptions. We do not compensate for a lack of data with fabricated precision.

5. We determine criticality and time to impact

We assess how quickly the initial event affects the critical function, what capacity is lost, which responsibilities remain, and how long it will take to replace or restore them. Time is a variable in its own right: the same loss occurring two days later as it does six months later requires a different response.

6. We develop scenarios and impact pathways

We formulate a baseline, a worst-case and, where necessary, a more severe scenario, each with clear input conditions. We track the direct effect, secondary dependencies, operational capacity, revenue, costs, cash flow, contractual implications and recovery.

A scenario is a conditional statement: ‘if these conditions occur, given these assumptions, this outcome will follow’. It does not prove that the conditions will occur, nor is an arbitrary probability assigned to it simply to make it appear quantitative.

7. We compare the measures and their trade-offs

We assess the impact, timeframe, cost, reversibility and new risks of each measure. Diversification may reduce concentration but increase costs and complexity; stockpiling buys time, but ties up capital and may become obsolete; in-house production increases control, but requires investment and capacity.

8. We prioritise according to criticality and evidence

First, we consider risks where the function is critical, the impact is rapid, the substitute is weak, the loss is significant, and the measure is practically feasible. The decision is not based mechanically on a colour-coded matrix, but on traceable reasoning and sensitivity to assumptions.

9. We define indicators, thresholds and responsibilities

We select a small number of monitored indicators: concentration, stock coverage, replacement lead time, capacity utilisation, price exposure, arrears, contractual events, regulatory deadlines or other specific signals. For each threshold, we define the source, frequency, owner and action.

10. We document the limitations and the update policy

The output includes a reference date, the data used, assumptions, unknown factors, sensitivity analysis and the conditions under which the conclusion ceases to apply. A significant change in supplier, customer, technology, route, price, contract or legislation requires an update.

How do we measure risk without apparent precision?

Where reliable frequencies, comparable observations and a stable mechanism exist, probabilities, ranges and expected loss can be used. In many geopolitical, regulatory and supply chain risks, data is scarce, the situation is changing, and the past is not a reliable indicator of the future. In such cases, a precise percentage would be a figure without sufficient empirical basis.

Ratings from 1 to 5 for probability and impact may be useful for prioritisation and communication, but they are ordinal categories. Multiplying them does not produce an objectively measured probability or loss. Therefore, every scale must have predefined criteria, and boundary decisions must be tested using scenarios and sensitivity analysis.

When probability is uncertain, we analyse what the outcome would be in the event of a specific disruption or interruption, how much time is available to react, which losses are reversible, and which measures remain reasonable when there is more than one possible future. This results in less apparent precision but a better practical basis for action.

Is every dependency a weakness?

No. Specialisation, international trade, long-term relationships and scale generate productivity precisely through interdependence. Complete self-sufficiency is usually more expensive, technologically inferior and merely shifts the risk to domestic resources.

Dependence becomes a vulnerability when the subject matter is critical, concentration is opaque, substitution is slow or legally and technically difficult, the party has a weak bargaining position, and disruption or interruption causes a loss that cannot be borne.

Consequently, the right question is not ‘how can we eliminate the dependency’, but ‘what value do we derive from it, under what conditions might it be used against us or be disrupted, what alternatives do we have, and what price are we prepared to pay for greater autonomy’.

What is the trade-off between efficiency and security?

A model with minimal stock, a single cheapest supplier, a central warehouse and capacity utilised to the maximum may be efficient under normal conditions. These same characteristics can accelerate the spread of disruption when a single link fails.

The opposite model—with multiple suppliers, excess capacity, large inventories and localised production—can withstand more shocks, but increases costs, complexity, capital requirements and the likelihood of resources remaining unused.

The managerial choice can be formulated as a constrained optimisation problem. The aim is not to maximise redundancy, but to achieve an economically sound balance between the cost of normal operations, preparedness, disruption or interruption, and residual risk, provided that critical functions remain above a minimum acceptable level. Where some public harms, rights or legal obligations cannot be accurately quantified in monetary terms, they are treated as separate constraints and criteria, rather than as a fictitiously precise cost.

What knowledge does the analysis generate?

Definitional knowledge

It defines what ‘critical function’, ‘dependency’, ‘disruption’, ‘interruption’, ‘minimum capacity’ and ‘acceptable risk’ mean for the specific contracting authority. Without these definitions, the result cannot be verified or replicated.

Factual and descriptive knowledge

Identifies known counterparties, flows, concentrations, contractual terms, inventories, capacity and observed disruptions or interruptions as at a specific date. Validity depends on the completeness and reliability of the sources.

Structural and diagnostic knowledge

It shows where the system has a single point of failure, a common source of alternatives, slow substitutability or a loss transmission channel. This knowledge explains how the system’s structure allows the impact to occur, but does not automatically prove which external shock will occur.

Causal knowledge

A causal inference requires a traceable mechanism and a plausible alternative: what would have happened without the specific shock or measure. The observed simultaneity between an event and a loss is not sufficient if other explanations exist.

Probabilistic knowledge

Probability is stated only where there is a sufficient basis for assessment and the method is applicable to the specific risk. In the case of structural change, a unique event or strategic behaviour on the part of participants, the probability may remain undefined or be presented as a range with low confidence.

Conditional knowledge

A scenario illustrates what would follow under specified conditions. It enables the preparation and comparison of decisions, but is not a prophecy and does not establish the frequency of the event.

Normative conclusion

The data alone do not determine how much risk is morally, politically or administratively acceptable. The choice depends on rights, legal obligations, cost, the distribution of harm, public significance, responsibility towards employees and citizens, and the possibility of compensation. The analysis makes the consequences and trade-offs visible; the competent authority or management bears the responsibility for the decision.

Advantages of economic security analysis

The analysis reveals interdependencies that financial statements only show once a loss has occurred. It links suppliers, resources, routes, technology, customers and funding to the specific function and the time to impact.

It allows limited resources to be directed towards critical points, rather than treating all risks equally. Comparing the cost of the measure, the capacity retained and the reduced residual risk helps to avoid both inadequate preparation and excessive spending on formal security.

The scenarios highlight secondary consequences and potential cascade effects. The plan for indicators and thresholds transforms the analysis from a one-off report into a management system for monitoring and timely response.

For public institutions, this approach makes it possible to distinguish between the criticality of the service, economic efficiency, the social cost of disruption or interruption, and the distribution of damage. For companies, it links resilience to actual revenue, margins, contracts, capacity and competitiveness.

Limitations and potential shortcomings

Supply chains are often opaque beyond the first level. Seemingly independent suppliers may share raw materials, subcontractors, infrastructure or ownership. Missing data limits confidence and must be noted, not concealed.

Rare and strategic events do not allow probabilities to be reliably derived from historical frequency alone. Geopolitical and regulatory regimes may change, and people and organisations adapt their behaviour. The model remains a limited representation, not a replica of the future.

Every protective measure comes at a cost. Diversification may reduce the scope and quality of control; reserves may become obsolete; insurance may have exclusions; localisation may increase costs; additional information may create an administrative burden. A measure that reduces one risk may create another.

The analysis may be skewed by optimistic internal assessments, organisational interests or a desire to present a pre-selected solution as necessary. Therefore, assumptions, sources and criteria must be documented and subject to verification.

Not all events can be foreseen. The value of the analysis lies not only in the list of scenarios, but in building the capacity to respond to an event that does not fully match the preliminary model.

Is economic security analysis mandatory?

There is no universal obligation for every organisation to commission a service under this name. The need is a management decision and depends on criticality, concentration, potential loss, contractual relationships and public function.

A specific law, regulatory regime, contract, funding programme, insurer, client or standard may require an assessment of risk, business continuity, suppliers, critical infrastructure or a specific plan. Whether such an obligation applies is determined on a case-by-case basis for each entity and activity. This analysis does not automatically replace a legally required assessment, audit, certification or plan.

Even where it is not formally mandatory, the analysis is economically justified if the value of the better solution and the preventable loss exceed the cost of information and preparation.

What does the client receive?

The specific outcome is determined in the individual contract. It typically includes a defined scope and critical functions, a map of economic flows and interdependencies, data assessment, a register of material risks, an analysis of concentration and substitutability, time to impact and recovery, scenarios with operational and financial consequences, a comparison of measures, a priority plan, early warning indicators, and restrictions and rules for updating.

The financial implications are examined to the extent necessary to assess the tolerability of the disruption or interruption. Where a detailed analysis of cost price, margins, liquidity, working capital or budgets is required, this shall be determined within the scope of the ‘Financial Analysis and Management Stress Tests’ section.

Market, sector or forecast estimates may be used where necessary to determine exposure, likely recovery or alternatives. Where the issue requires independent market research or a formal econometric model, the relevant component is defined separately within the scope of the project.

The result may be delivered as an analytical report, an executive summary, a dependency map, a working model, a dashboard, a presentation or a technical appendix. Each recommended measure is linked to a specific vulnerability, expected effect, cost, timeframe, responsibility, prerequisites and residual risk.

How long does it take?

The initial definition of the scope, the scope of the analysis and the adequacy of the sample data typically takes 5–10 working days.

A focused analysis of a single organisation, critical function or limited set of dependencies usually takes 15–30 working days once sufficient data has been received.

An analysis of a group, a complex chain, multiple public services, geographical dependencies or several interrelated scenarios usually takes 30–60 working days or more. The timeframe increases where data is sourced from multiple departments and counterparties, or where additional verification, interviews, legal or technical expertise, and coordination between institutions are required.

The timeframe indicated is indicative and begins upon receipt of the necessary input data. Where information is obtained from external sources or under the Access to Public Information Act, or where data is incomplete or contradictory, the timeframe may be extended.

When is the analysis complete?

The analysis is complete when the decision and critical functions have been precisely defined; the key dependencies have been mapped within the limits of the available data; the facts, assumptions and unknowns have been distinguished; the scenarios are traceable; measures have been compared in terms of effect, cost and new risk; responsibilities and signals have been defined; and the limitations enable the client to understand what the result proves and what it does not prove.

Every result has a reference date. Economic security is not a static state, but a dynamic capability. A new contract, owner, technology, route, regulation, price or geopolitical event may alter the assessment.

Do not start by asking ‘are we secure?’. Start by asking ‘which function can we not afford to lose, what does it depend on, how much time do we have to react, and what cost is justified to maintain our capacity to act?’.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is economic security in plain language?

It is the ability of an organisation or public system to maintain or restore its most critical economic functions in the event of disruptions to supplies, resources, funding, demand or the regulatory environment. A disruption is a partial impairment, whilst a breakdown is a complete cessation of a function or resource. Economic security does not mean the absence of risk, but rather a prepared capacity to act.

Is it the same as national, physical or cyber security?

No. This service analyses economic interdependencies, consequences and resilience. It does not constitute an activity relating to national security, security, intelligence, cyber testing or technical protection. Where a physical or digital risk has economic consequences, we use the assessment of the relevant competent specialist as input.

Who is the analysis intended for?

For companies, groups, public institutions, professional organisations and institutional investors that depend on critical suppliers, customers, resources, infrastructure, technologies, contracts, specialists or funding. The method is determined by the function and the decision, not just by the sector or size.

What risks can be analysed?

Supplies, raw materials, energy, logistics, concentration of customers and markets, prices, working capital, critical technologies and licences, key skills, regulatory changes and geo-economic exposure. Legal and technical aspects, including cyber security, are assessed separately by a competent specialist.

Is every dependency dangerous?

No. Dependencies often lead to specialisation, quality and lower costs. They become significant vulnerabilities when the function is critical, concentration is high, substitution is slow or impossible, and the consequences cannot be borne.

What data is required?

Data is usually required on critical processes, revenue and customers, suppliers and purchases, materials, stock, routes, capacity, contractual deadlines, costs, cash flows, alternative options, critical technologies and skills. The minimum set of data is determined once the specific question has been formulated.

Can the analysis be carried out using public sources alone?

Yes, but it will primarily reveal external and sector-specific exposure. Public data rarely reveals actual contracts, stock levels, margins, spare capacity and lead times. This limitation is explicitly stated and is not masked by apparent accuracy.

Does the analysis guarantee that a crisis will be avoided?

No. The analysis does not predict every event and does not eliminate risk. It identifies known vulnerabilities, assesses the consequences under clear-cut scenarios and compares measures, so that the organisation has a better basis for decision-making and more time to react.

Is the analysis mandatory?

Not as a one-size-fits-all service for every organisation. A specific law, contract, standard, regulator, funding programme or client may require a specific risk or business continuity assessment. Applicability is assessed on a case-by-case basis, and this service does not replace an official assessment or certification.

What exactly does the client receive?

The standard deliverable includes a map of critical functions and dependencies, an assessment of concentration and substitutability, time to impact and recovery, scenarios, economic impacts, a comparison of measures, a prioritisation plan, early warning indicators, assumptions and limitations. The format is specified in the quotation.

How long does it take and how is the price determined?

The scope and data assessment typically takes 5–10 working days. A focused analysis may take 15–30 working days, whilst a complex cluster, supply chain or public system may take 30–60 working days or more. The price depends on the number of functions and dependencies, the quality of the data, the scenarios, external sources and the format of the deliverable.

How does the commissioning process begin?

The first step is a brief description of the analytical question and of the organisation, activity or public function whose resilience is to be examined. Critical dependencies, potential disruptions or interruptions, the forthcoming management decision or action, the time horizon and the available data are specified. SOLISFERADOME ANALYTICS then defines the boundaries of the system under analysis, the critical functions and dependencies, the applicable scenarios and indicators, the necessary sources, the expected outcome, the timetable and the individual price.